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ABSTRACT: The management of sensitive data, including identity management (IDM), is an 
important problem in cloud computing, fundamental for authentication and fine-grained service 
access control. Our goal is creating an efficient and robust IDM solution that addresses critical 
issues in cloud computing. The proposed IDM scheme does not rely on trusted third parties 
(TTPs) or trusted dealers. The scheme is a   multiparty  interactive  solution  that  combines  RSA  
distributed  key  generation  and  attribute-based encryption. We believe that it will be a robust 
IDM privacy-preserving solution in cloud computing, because it has the following features: (i) 
protects sensitive data on untrusted hosts using active bundle; (ii) supports the minimum 
disclosure property; (iii) minimizes authentication overhead by providing single sign-on; (iv) 
supports authentication with encrypted credentials; (v) avoids using trusted third parties (TTPs_, 
incl. using TTPs for key management; (vi) supports revocation and delegation of access 
right; and  (vii) supports revocation of user credentials. The scheme should also be efficient 
because it exploits parallelism. 
 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Privacy in Cloud Computing 
 
A cloud is made of interconnected computers and virtualized servers that are controlled and offered as a pool of 
computing resources. It is managed based on a service-level agreement between customers and service providers 
(Vaquero, Rodero-Merino, Caceres & Lindner, 2008). Consumers are no longer in charge of maintenance, software 
services, or managing storage space, network size or servers; all these resources can be provided as a service. The 
cloud resources can be accessed and priced on demand and per usage. They can be offered in the form of software as 
a service, platform as a service, database as a service, and so on. 
Cloud security is considered to be the top issue for customers, with 87.5% indicating it as a concern, more 
than cloud issues such as availability, lack of interoperability standards, cost, and performance (Christiansen, 
Kolodgy, Hudson and Pintal, 2010). Cloud security challenges include data leakage, performance, risk management, 
secure storage data protection, and identity management (Jansen, 2011). 
But—most important for us in this paper—cloud consumers also have a great concern about cloud privacy 
(Pearson, Shen & Mowbray, 2009). If there is no privacy guarantee by a cloud, consumers might not be willing to 
use its services (Ryan, 2011; Zhang, Yang, Zhang, Liu & Chen, 2012). 
Protecting privacy in clouds is more difficult than in traditional computing environments, because sensitive 
data may be disseminated and stored over many external computing facilities (Wang, Ren, Lou and Li, 2010, 
managed by external service providers (Dinadayalan, Jegadeeswari & Gnanambigai, 2014). Privacy issues in cloud 
environment have been extensively studied. Many solutions and strategies designed to deal with privacy issues were 
introduced, and many analyses conducted to measure privacy loses and to assess unauthorized access to sensitive 
data. Several techniques have been proposed, among others, for identity management, privacy enhanced protocols, 
and use of cryptography.
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Protection in cloud environments is needed on both customer and service sides, since both clouds and 
their customers can be malicious (Mulazzani et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2012). 
Many types of sensitive information are stored and disseminated in clouds, including personal identity 
data, financial data, personal information, usage data, and important equipment IDs (Malik & Nazir, 2012; Tang 
et al., 2012). All need to be safeguarded. 
Many privacy and security principles should be used to protect data in the cloud. They include proper use- 
disclosure and retention, accountability, openness and transparency, and compliance (Tang et al., 2012; Luo et al., 
2011). These principles are not integrated into all privacy mechanisms, and our approach tries to address the 
majority of them in our scheme. 
 
 
1.2.  Identity  Management in Cloud Computing 
 
A strong identity management (IDM) system is needed to assure privacy and security in a computing system, also in 
a cloud. It should allow users to fully manage and control their personal credentials and sensitive information 
entrusted to a cloud provider. This can be achieved via a self-service feature (Habiba et al., 2013). 
Unlike traditional IDM systems, cloud-based IDM systems need a built-in effective IDM role control, 
including identity and access control provisioning and de-provisioning, authentication and federation, compliance, 
scalability, entitlement and synchronization (Kumaraswamy et al., 2010; Cao & Yang, 2010). Such control 
functions are important in order to successfully provide management of authentication and identity between cloud 
providers and consumers (Kumaraswamy et al., 2010). 
Diverse cloud-based IDMs have been presented in the past. Most of them address many needed 
functionalities— for instance, authentication, access rights, or authorization—but a comprehensive cloud-based 
IDM solution that addresses all or most important cloud privacy issues does not exist yet. 
There are two common types of cloud-based IDM solutions: decentralized IDMs and centralized IDMs. 
Centralized IDMs rely on trusted third parties (TTPs) to enforce privacy policy. TTP is a bottleneck and a single 
point of failure (Ben Othmane & Lilien, 2010; Angin, Bhargava, Ranchal, Singh, Linderman, Ben Othmane & 
Lilien, 2010; Ranchal, Bhargava, Ben Othmane, Lilien, Kim, Kang & Linderman, 2010). Decentralized IDMs do not 
rely on a TTP for the creation and verification of credentials; instead, they possess strong authentication capabilities. 
 
 
1.3.  Contribution and Paper Organization 
 
This paper reviews existing IDM solutions for the cloud, and propose an efficient cloud IDM solution. The review 
considers cloud-based IDM assessment criteria proposed by  Habiba et al. (2013) and secure computing methods 
presented by ben Othmane and Lilien (2010). The proposed solution does not require trusted third parties (TTPs) 
while providing credential protection, and built-in IDM support features. 
The paper is organized as follows: related work is discussed in Section 2.  Using the insights gained from 
the review section, we built our cloud IDM solution; it is presented in Section 3.  Section 4 concludes the paper 
and mentions directions for future work. 
 
 
 
2. RELATED WORK 
 
IDM in clouds has been the topic of many papers (e.g., Habiba et al., 2013; Angin et al. (2010). We review some of 
the privacy and security recommendations and considerations presented in ben Othmane et al. (2010) and  Habiba et 
al. (2013). We then review some common cloud-based IDM solutions, and compare them based on two major 
criteria: (i) support for centralized or decentralized trust management; and (ii) support for built-in IDM features. We 
highlight the advantages and disadvantages for each IDM model. 
Ates et al. (2011) proposes a TTP module for IDM that consists of logical identity proxy, including identity 
as a service. It supports the following features:  secure authentication, authorization, auditing, single sign-on (SSO) 
capability, and entity credential management. The drawbacks of this solutions include its dependency on TTP, and 
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not supporting the minimum disclosure property. In addition, it does not provide any protection for sensitive data on 
untrusted hosts. 
Ranchal et al. (2010) proposed an IDM system that is independent of TTPs. The scheme uses active bundles 
(ben Othame & Lilien, 2009) as a sensitive data encapsulation mechanism to protect against untrusted host, and 
combines multiparty computation and predicate encryption to provide secure authentication without disclosing the 
plaintext credentials. The drawback of the proposed IDM system is the fact that it relies on a trusted dealer. The 
scheme lacks several core IDM functions, such as assuring access rights or  delegation for user credentials. 
Angin et al. (2010) propose an entity-centric IDM approach, called an IDM wallet. It uses the zero-
knowledge proof for anonymous identification, active bundles for protecting privacy, and Fiat and Shamir’s (1987) 
identification scheme for protecting digital identity in cloud computing. The solution acts as a mediator during the 
interaction between the cloud services and entities.  The authors claim that their scheme addresses common major 
limitations and issues found in other approaches related to the protection of digital identity, such as Windows 
CardSpace of Alrodhan & Mitchell (2009), and Open ID (OpenID, 2010).  One unique feature of the scheme is 
assuring the limited disclosure property (to minimize the risk of information leak during authentication). The 
scheme does not provide any fine-grained access control mechanism or credential management. 
Choudhury et al. (2011) proposes a decentralized IDM solution independent of TTPs. The scheme 
provides strong entity authentication, achieved in two authentication phases: the first using smart-card-based bilinear 
pairings, and the second using passwords. The framework supports credential management, minimum disclosure 
property (since identities are transmitted via two authentication-isolated channels), and identity federation or SSO 
(to avoid redundancy and eliminate the need to store such identities at multiple places). The distribution of 
credentials relies on smart cards for storing some information, and relies on a one-time key sent by the server to 
the mobile user via SMS. The drawbacks of the solution include a lack of authorization, and no protection for 
sensitive data on untrusted hosts. 
The Chowdhury & Noll (2007) scheme is a secure service-interaction role-based centralized IDM model, 
independent of TTPs. Identities are categorized into multiple levels of personal, social, and corporate identities. The 
scheme supports secure user authentication, the minimum disclosure property, federation, and credential 
management. Authentication is supported via attributes and identifiers. The scheme incorporates a single identity 
provider (IdP) to share and distribute user identity credentials to other service providers (SPs). Federation is assured 
via the distribution of identity across multiple sites. The drawback of this solution include no support for auditing, 
and no protection for sensitive data on untrusted hosts. 
Others schemes support good features that can be implement in a cloud-based IDM. For example, Li et al. 
(2010) address system- and tenant-level access control issues but do not provide details about authentication and 
implementation. Albeshri and Caelli (2010) propose a cloud-policing module that is claimed to offer mutual 
protection. It performs two tasks: initial matching and continuous monitoring. The organization and service provider 
can create their own profiles that can be intersected based on a profile matchmaker. Again we find no details on how 
to implement the solution. In addition, the authors suggest that the policing tasks be hosted by a TTP. 
The decentralized IDM schemes are more secure than the centralized ones but there are still some issues that 
make decentralized IDM schemes deficient. Problems include relying on a trusted dealer, lack of necessary IDM 
features, or failing to validate the solution by simulation or experimentally. 
 
 
 
3. THE PROPOSED APPROACH 
 
3.1.  The Required Solution Features 
 
We start description of the proposed cloud IDM solution with defining its required features: 
 
(i)    Protect sensitive data on untrusted hosts:  Data need to be protected during their life cycle, 
especially in a cloud environment where the user and the service provider have less control of 
data movement. In particular they might be unable to prevent moving sensitive data to untrusted 
hosts. To date, most IDM solutions require data to reside on trusted hosts. 
(ii)    Limit disclosure of identification data to minimize damage: Cloud IDM needs to satisfy this goal 
in order to guarantee the minimum disclosure of user identity when communicating with the 
service provider during the authentication phase or anonymous identification.   The proof of 
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identity can use many methods, including zero knowledge, pseudonym-based, and attribute-based 
encryption. 
(iii)  Minimize authentication overhead by providing single sign-on (SSO):  The SSO feature assures 
that users can access all required or trusted resources without having to login separately for 
accessing each resource individually (Jøsang, Fabre, Hay, Dalziel & Pope, 2005; Jansen, 2011). 
However, SSO might make IDM vulnerable to many attacks, such as dictionary attacks, identity 
thefts, eavesdropping and others (Modi, Patel, Borisaniya, Patel & Rajarajan, 2013). To prevent 
this, we need to use two-factor authentication. 
(iv)   Authenticate  with  encrypted  credentials:    An  entity  needs  to  send  its  encrypted  identity 
credentials to the service provider. If the credentials are decrypted at the service provider, they 
become vulnerable to attacks; secure computing allowing to authorize without decryption would 
overcome this problem. 
(v)    Avoid using TTPs, incl. using TTPs for key management: There are many issues that occur when 
relying on TTPs, such as TTP as a single point of failure, TTP not protecting against many types 
of attacks (including side-channel, and correlation attacks), and TTP not supporting dynamic key 
management. 
(vi)   Provide revocation and delegation of access rights:  In cloud IDM access rights for services and 
resources are granted to authorized users.  There should be a mechanism to take them away (e.g., 
in response to abuse of rights by a user). 
(vii) Provide  revocation  of  user  credentials:  There  should  be  a  mechanism  to  take  away  user 
credentials; this could include credential time-outs. Current IDM approaches do not support 
revocation of user credentials, if the user does not demand any services. 
 
 
 
3.2. Providing Solution Features 
 
The required solution features (listed above) will be provided as follows: 
(i)     Sensitive data are protected on untrusted hosts with active bundles. The active bundle scheme (presented 
in more detail later) protects data through their entire life cycle. 
(ii) The minimum disclosure property is realized with attribute-based encryption. 
(iii)  Authentication uses SSO. One approach to SSO is through group authentication, where members of 
a group can authenticate as a part of an (authorized) group, and have the right to modify or decrypt stored 
data. In contrast to most conventional user authentication schemes with one prover and one verifier, the 
group authentication [Ham, 2013] is a many-to-many type of authentication with multiple provers and 
multiple verifiers. This makes group authentication very efficient since it is sufficient to authenticate all 
users of a group at once. (If there are non-members, group authentication can be used as a preprocess 
before applying conventional user authentication to identify nonmembers.) 
(iv)  Authentication uses encrypted credentials.  This allows for anonymous authentication, in which user 
identities are not disclosed (Zhou & Lin, 2005). Previous schemes used common approaches, such as zero- 
knowledge proof, and predicate encryption for authentication.   In contrast, we use attribute-based 
encryption where users can be authenticated based on the enforced privacy policy. 
(v)    Not using TTPs for key management (or other activities): We use decentralized shared-key management, 
providing independence of TTPs.  More precisely, we rely on threshold cryptography, which does not 
store decrypted keys on a single server (as is the case when TTPs are used) that might be vulnerable to 
attacks and failures. The solution will be based on the approaches of Ben-Or et al (1988) or Shamir 
(1979). 
(vi)   Supports revocation and delegation of access right. 
(vii)  Supports revocation of user credentials. 
Furthermore, the efficiency of our proposed scheme will be enhanced by exploiting parallelism. 
 
 
3.3.   Solution Components 
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3.3.1.  RSA Distributed Key Generation 
 
One of the major tasks in threshold cryptography systems is distributed shared key generation (DSKG).  DSKG is 
considered to be a very important application of multiparty computation (MPC), because it eliminates the concept of 
a trusted dealer—and this is the main objective of MPC as cited by Nishide (2008). The public and private key pairs 
are generated in a distributed way using a set of n servers. In this scheme, keys are never combined or restored on 
one site. A system cannot be compromised under this technique as the attacker cannot learn anything in case few 
(< n) servers are corrupted. 
 
 
3.3.2.  The BGW Protocol 
 
The BGW protocol, invented by Ben-Or et al. (1988), allows a set of parties to jointly compute a chosen function f 
on shared or private input (from n input to n output). This is achieved by emulating securely the arithmetic circuit 
that is computing f. In case of semi-honest adversaries where threshold t < n/2, parties first share their input using 
Shamir's secret sharing (Blakley, 1979; Shamir, 1979). In case of malicious adversaries, a verifiable secret sharing 
protocol (Chor et al. 1985; Goldreich et al., 1987) is used.  The perfect secrecy of the protocol functionality was 
proven by Asharov and Lindell (2014). 
 
 
 
3.3.3.  Shamir's Threshold Secret Sharing 
 
The concept of secret sharing was introduced by Blakley (1979) and Shamir (1979). The scheme works in two 
phases. First, in the sharing phase, a secret key is initially hold by a dealer and then distributed by it to n parties. 
Second, in the reconstruction phase, each party i reveals a part of its private information vi, such that the secret d can 
be obtained based on a reconstruction function d = reconstruct (d1, d2, d3…). The private key cannot be generated 
or reconstructed by a quorum of less than t parties. 
The function sharing scheme (Chor et al., 1985; Goldreich et al., 1987) is a useful extension of secret sharing 
in case of active dishonesty. 
 
 
3.3.4.  Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) 
 
Enforcing and specifying access-control-policy-based attribute has advantages compared to specifying the policies 
based upon individual identities. Attribute-based encryption (ABE) allows to avoid the risk of compromising data 
and the complexity of cryptographic key management in cases when the ciphertext needs to be shared among 
multiple parties.  In ABE data is encrypted with a concealed access structure. Data can only be decrypted if the 
decrypter’s private attribute-based key satisfies the encrypted data access structure. There are two kinds of ABE 
attribute-based  encryption  schemes:  key-policy  attribute-based  encryption  (KP-ABE)  and  ciphertext-policy 
attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE). 
KP-ABE has some strong restrictions and limitations. Attributes have to be known publicly, user cannot 
access encrypted data based on the access tree (Bethencourt et al., 2007), and the encrypter cannot control the 
attributes. 
CP-ABE also removes the dependency on TTP present in identity-based encryption (IBE) (Shamir, 1985)—in 
CP-ABE decryption can be done with entities that satisfy the decryption policy. 
 
 
3.3.5.  The Active Bundle Scheme 
 
Lilien and Bhargava (2006) and Ben Othmane and  Lilien (2009) proposed active bundles (ABs) that protect 
sensitive data by bundling them with metadata and a virtual machine (cf. Figure 1).  The sensitive data can include: 
name, birth date, social security number, image, or a valuable computer program.  The metadata include, among 
others, privacy policies for sensitive data. Metadata manages and protects the privacy of the active bundle’s 
sensitive data.  AB’s virtual machine can perform a set of operations on the AB, such as validation of integrity, 
access control and dissemination policy enforcement. 
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ABs encapsulate and protect sensitive data throughout their lifetime.  They can apoptosize all AB’s data 
(delete them in a clean way) or evaporate a part of the AB’s data. AB’s data are completely apoptosized if the visited 
host’s trust level is below the apoptosis threshold. AB’s data is partially evaporated if the visited host’s trust level is 
above the apoptosis threshold but below the evaporation threshold. The AB with all its data intact arrives at the 
visited host if its trust level exceeds the evaporation threshold. 
Once on a visited host, the AB uses its privacy policies to decide which data can be given to the host 
when requested by it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sensitive Data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Metadata 
 
Virtual Machine 
 
 
Figure 1:  Basic structure of an Active Bundle [Ben Othmane & Lilien, 2009] 
 
 
 
 
4. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME 
 
This section describes our IDM scheme for cloud computing. We construct it by combining the following 
techniques: distributed shared key generation (DSKG) (Boneh et al., 2001), ciphertext-policy attribute-based 
encryption (CP-ABE), and active bundles (AB). Attribute-based encryption can be used as a flexible method 
supporting confidential communication between parties in distributed systems. CP-ABE permits assessment over 
encrypted data as the ciphertext decryption takes place only if the attributes satisfy the ciphertext access structure. 
Our scheme consists of two basics phases:  (a) distributed key generation; and (b) decryption phases.  In the 
first phase, RSA key pairs (e, N) and (d, N) are generated using the protocol of Boneh et al. (2001). In the second 
phase, each party computes the partial decryptions. Thus, the secret exponent d can be reconstructed using t out of k 
parties. We enhanced the protocol of Boneh et al. (2001) by enforcing the ciphertext with privacy-policy-based 
attributes. 
Our scheme requires that parties involved in the decryption phase are initially chosen and given access-
policy attributes by the service provider (SP).  An SP receiving the initial identities from the user performs two 
activities: (i) distributes the access-policy attributes to the parties; and (ii) determines the number of participants in 
the decryption process—based on the identity rank level and security level of the operation. For example, assume 
that Alice holds a senior position in a company, and Bob is a regular employee. Alice’s position demands the SSO 
access type (so she can access multiple services with one sign-on) and Bob’s does not (he will have to sign on many 
times for multiple services).  In this case, we require that the number of parties that should participate in key 
sharing and decryption is larger for Alice than for Bob.  The idea is that the higher access rights require stronger 
security measures for the authentication process. 
We follow recommendations and techniques presented by Habiba et al. (2013) and Ben Othmane et al. 
(2010), and attribute-based encryption techniques presented by Ibraimi at al. (2009). Part of our scheme is similar 
to the solution presented by Doshi and Jinwala (2011) for secret share verification and correctness. Doshi and 
Jinwala propose that the secret is released to shareholders only if the policy is satisfied. In our scheme we don't have 
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trusted dealer as in their work, since several parties are involved in the secret generation and sharing.  Our protocol uses additive 
sharing proposed by Ben-Or et al. (1988). 
Our scheme supports fault tolerance by allowing some parties to hold additional partial shares distributed by other 
members. In order to guarantee a correct group-based decryption, we employee CP-ABE for accurate and correct decryption of 
the ciphertext. By hashing each share and using OR gates during decryption, we avoid any involvement of duplicate shares in the 
decryption process that might impact the decryption process. We also use time attribute (Paterson & Quaglia, 2010) and location 
attribute to maximize the level of security during the ciphertext decryption phase. This should help eliminating any malicious 
parties. In other words, parties are given an access policy and can participate in the protocol if their attributes satisfy it. 
Delegation and revocation of attributes are two important features, which are becoming increasingly important in modern 
access control systems. In our scheme we support delegation in which a user or delegator holding a secret key  (associated with 
some attributes) can  generate for another user a secret key associated with a smaller number of attributes (Ibraimi, Petkovic, 
Hartel and Jonker, 2009).  For example, let us assume that Alice has the secret key SK and the attribute set: Alice = (head of 
security lab, lecturer, member of security lab). Alice wants to allow Bob, her Ph.D. student, to access the lab during her absence. 
Alice can generate another secret key for Bob using her private key and Bob’s attribute set: Bob= (lecturer, member of security 
lab). Our scheme also supports delegation such that Alice can delegate only some of her access rights to Bob, which happens by 
delegating some of her attributes Bob. Revocation is also a required feature. a secret key associated with less number of attributes 
or restrictive number of attribute. When Bob graduates after defending his dissertation, Alice can revoke his access rights 
(Ibraimi, Petkovic, Hartel and Jonker, 2009). 
Our scheme uses five algorithms: setup, encrypt, keyGen, decrypt, and revocation. 
1)  The setup algorithm is run by a user to set up an algorithm to generate the public key PK and the master key 
MK. 
2)  A user encrypts her personal identification using PK. The encrypt algorithm takes user identity and access tree 
information and encrypts it with the generated PK to generate ciphertext CT.   The encrypted user identity CT can be 
stored on an untrusted host since it is protected by an active bundle. 
3)  For authentication, a user is authenticated based on his attributes. A decentralized cloud authority uses the keyGen 
algorithm; it takes as input MK and the user’s set of attributes obtained in the initial communication. For example, an 
authentication for a VIP (that, e.g., requires the SSO service federating multiple services) requires more parties to be 
involved than authentication of a less important user. 
4)  The decrypt algorithm takes as input the message, PK, and access tree information and assures that only users with 
proper attributes can decrypt if their CTs satisfy the access policy. 
5)  For revocation, the attribute revocation list is maintained by one of the multiparty servers, and decryption is 
denied in case of a user who had her rights revoked. 
 
 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
Our goal is creating an efficient and robust IDM solution that addresses critical issues in cloud computing environment. We 
reviewed common IDM solutions for cloud computing. Required solution features were identified, and means of providing them 
were specified. We described the major components of the proposed solution. 
We outlined the proposed decentralized IDM solution for the clouds that offers desirable characteristics for protecting user 
credentials in untrusted hosts. The solution does not rely on trusted third parties (TTPs) or trusted dealers. It is a multiparty 
interactive solution that combines, among others, RSA distributed key generation and attribute-based encryption. 
We believe that our solution will be robust, because it has the following features: (i) protects sensitive data on untrusted 
hosts using active bundle; (ii) supports the minimum disclosure property; (iii) minimizes authentication overhead by providing 
single sign-on; (iv) supports authentication with encrypted credentials; (v) avoids using trusted third parties (TTPs, incl. using 
TTPs for key management; (vi) supports revocation and delegation of access right; and (vii) supports revocation of user 
credentials. The scheme should also be efficient because it exploits parallelism. 
This work will be continued with a comprehensive simulation to study the proposed solution. Based on the insights 
gained from the simulation, the protocol will be corrected if necessary, optimized, and enhanced with additional features and 
capabilities. 
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